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Abstract 
 
The article is focused on the analysis of the 
infrastructural components of bribery in public 
official activity. The term "infrastructure" comes 
from Latin (infra – below, under and structura – 
construction, placement) and means a set of 
components of any object that are subordinate 
(ancillary) character and provide conditions for 
the normal functioning of the object as a whole. 
The concept of crime infrastructure is not enough 
explored in legal science. The research described 
in the article was created using different methods 
of scientific research. The main method of 
scientific research – the dialectical method. This 
method allows substantiating the special role of 
"human", organizational-support and ideological 
resources in the determination of criminal 
behavior. The method of analysis helps to see in 
detail a large number of cases of bribery in public 
service. Further, the generalization were made 
regarding the general infrastructure components 
of bribery in the field of public service activity 
using the synthesis method. In addition to these 
methods of scientific research, the authors of the 
article used the methods of deduction, induction, 
and comparative method. The public service 
bribery infrastructure should be understood as a 
collection of "personnel", material and intangible 
resources, organizational forms and means that 
serve the illicit purchase/sale of services of public 
officials provide functionality and facilitate the 
  Анотація 
 
Стаття присвячена аналізу інфраструктурних 
складових підкупу у сфері публічної 
службової діяльності. . Термін 
«інфраструктура» походить від латини (infra 
– нижче, під і stuktura – побудова, 
розміщення) й означає сукупність складових 
частин якого-небудь об’єкта, що мають 
підпорядкований (допоміжний) характер і 
забезпечують умови нормального 
функціонування об’єкта в цілому. В правовій 
науці поняття інфраструктури злочинності є 
малодослідженим.Дослідження, описане в 
статті, було створено за допомогою різних 
методів наукового пізнання. Основний метод 
наукового дослідження був діалектичний 
метод. Цей метод дозволив обґрунтувати 
особливу роль «кадрових», організаційно-
допоміжних та ідеологічних ресурсів у 
детермінації злочинної поведінки. Метод 
аналізу допомагає детально дослідити велику 
кількість випадків підкупу у сфері публічної 
службової діяльності. На основі отриманих 
результатів аналізу, було зроблено 
узагальнення щодо інфраструктурних 
складових підкупу у сфері публічної 
службової діяльності за допомогою методу 
синтезу. Крім цих методів наукових 
досліджень, автори статті використовували 
методи дедукції, індукції та порівняльний 
метод. Під інфраструктурою підкупу у сфері 
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institution of bribery. The special role of the 
ideological and "human" resources, as well as 
organizational and auxiliary resources in the 
determination of criminal behavior is 
substantiated. The introduction of measures 
neutralizing the infrastructural capabilities of 
briberyas an indirectanti-corruption strategy is 
proposed. 
 
Keywords: Corruption, bribery, bribe, official 
crimes, infrastructure. 
 
публічної службової діяльності слід розуміти 
сукупність «кадрових», матеріальних і 
нематеріальних ресурсів, організаційних 
форм та засобів, які обслуговують незаконну 
купівлю/продаж послуг службових осіб 
публічної сфери, забезпечують 
функціональність та сприяють 
інституціалізації підкупу. Обґрунтовується 
особлива роль «кадрових», організаційно-
допоміжних та ідеологічних ресурсів у 
детермінації злочинної поведінки. 
Пропонується запровадження системи 
заходів нейтралізації інфраструктурних 
можливостей підкупу як опосередкованої 
стратегії протидії корупції. 
 
Ключові слова: корупція, хабарництво, 
підкуп, службові злочини, інфраструктура. 
 
Introduction 
 
Transformation of ideas about the essence of 
crime requires not only the study of socio-
political, organizational-managerial, economic, 
legal and other phenomena, as decisive 
processes of reproduction of illegal activity of 
individuals, but also the need to appeal to 
elements of service of interests of crime, which, 
at first glance, not are criminal in nature and 
therefore not prohibited by the Criminal Code 
of Ukraine. 
 
In the legal literature, the importance of 
knowing insufficiently understood socio-
psychological, intangible mechanism of 
formation and existence of unlawful criminal 
societies, including in its number of non-
criminal elements of crime (Ovchinskyi, & 
Eminov, 1996). In support of this contention, we 
consider that the appeal to the intangible 
mechanism of crime is insufficient. Equally 
important in this regard is the organizational, 
technical and another material base of criminal 
activity, which makes the criminal environment 
less vulnerable to law enforcement, more 
mobile, and adaptable to changes in social life. 
These are social security institutions, processes, 
and other material elements, which, on the one 
hand, are designed to improve and optimize the 
various spheres of life, and, on the other hand, 
(given their functional characteristics) can be 
used in criminal activities (this is a crime 
infrastructure). 
 
The term "infrastructure" comes from Latin 
(infra – below, under and structura – 
construction, placement) and means a set of 
components of any object that are subordinate 
(ancillary) character and provide conditions for 
the normal functioning of the object as a whole. 
For the first time, this term appeared in 
economics and was characterized by an 
aggregate of industries serving to manufacture. 
This includes the construction of roads, canals, 
reservoirs, ports, airfields, warehouses, energy, 
transport, communications, water supply, and 
sewerage; education, science, health, etc. 
(Prokhorov, 1985). Given the ambiguity of the 
term, distinguish social, transport, engineering, 
information, military, market, and several other 
infrastructures. 
 
It should be noted that the concept of crime 
infrastructure is not enough explored in legal 
science. Professor O.F. Dolzhenkov lays the 
foundations of this problem in the theory of 
operative-search activity. He defines crime 
infrastructure as a kind of environment and 
foundation that does not appear externally 
criminal, since it is essentially latent, but 
promotes the consolidation of criminal elements, 
the creation of organized groups and serves the 
material, financial, protective, subcultural, 
human, and other needs of the criminal system 
(Dolzhenkov, 2003). 
 
The scholar suggested that two areas should be 
identified within the crime infrastructure.  
 
The first area includes elements that directly 
serve the processes of criminal activity:  
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− Convenient ways to approach and exit 
the crime scene; secure from the point 
of view of criminals and the revenue 
channels of the stolen; legal enterprises 
through which money laundering 
(casinos, currency exchange offices, 
firms that facilitate real estate 
transactions, etc.) are carried out;  
− Computer and telecommunication 
networks facilitating criminal 
outcomes; bases, repositories for 
criminals (so-called "raspberries");  
− Institutions that carry out physical 
rehabilitation of criminals (saunas, 
cottages, medical facilities, etc.). 
 
The second area includes structures that are 
indirectly involved in criminal processes: 
  
− Training and recruiting for the criminal 
sphere; "ideological" centers for 
supporting and developing "thievery 
laws" and traditions; "schools", 
"seminars" on the exchange of criminal 
experience;  
− "Think tanks" of organized crime; the 
criminal subculture as a whole;  
− Some mass media and political 
institutions (“lobby”) in the service of 
criminal societies and so on 
(Dolzhenkov, 2003). 
 
O.F. Dolzhenkov also notes the special nature of 
crime infrastructure in the determination of 
unlawful behavior along with its causes and 
conditions. “Despite the differences of opinion 
regarding the bases for the classification of 
causes and conditions of crime, there is a 
common belief that they are a necessary 
component of it. In our view, another element in 
the mechanism of criminal activity is played by 
the elements of crime infrastructure. They have 
no direct criminogenic character, but serve the 
interests of the functioning of crime as a system, 
"facilitate" its criminal impact on the state of the 
operational and tactical situation, as a whole, and 
its components" (Dolzhenkov, 2003). 
 
The availability of such research gives grounds 
to consider crime infrastructure as a functional 
element of bribery in the public service sphere 
and, following the principle of counteraction, to 
propose measures to neutralize bribery 
infrastructure as an indirect strategy. 
 
Methodology and analysis of recent research  
 
The research described in the article was created 
using different methods of scientific research. 
First of all, the main method of scientific research 
– the dialectical method should be noted. This 
method allows substantiating the special role of 
"personnel", organizational-support and 
ideological resources in the determination of 
criminal behavior. 
 
Also, one of the main methods of service in this 
article is the method of analysis. The article 
analyzed in detail a large number of cases of 
bribery in public service. Further, on the results 
of the factual analysis, generalizations were 
made regarding the general infrastructure 
components of bribery in the field of public 
service activity using the synthesis method. In 
addition to these methods of scientific research, 
the authors of the article used the methods of 
deduction, induction, and comparative method. 
For the creation of this study, a large amount of 
scientific literature was analyzed on criminal 
offenses, criminalistics, peculiarities of bribery 
in the sphere of public official activity, 
determination of criminal behavior of 
participants in such criminal relations, as well 
as on the system of measures for combating this 
type of crime. Among the scientists whose 
works became the basis for writing the article, 
the following should be mentioned Ovchinskyi 
V.S., & Eminov, V.E. (1996); Dolzhenkov, O.F. 
(2003); Baulin, Y. V., Borisov, V. I., & Tutyugin, 
V. I. (2010); Benitskyi, A.S. (2011); 
Kudryavtsev, V.N. (2007); Karpenko, M. I., & 
Pashkovsky, V. V. (2013); Sungurov, A. Yu. 
(2000); Zelinskyi, A.F. (1999); Inshakov, S.M. 
(2002); Dremin, V.N. (2003, 2009); Gilinskyi, 
J.I. (2003). The empirical basis for the study was 
the facts of bribery in public service. 
 
Presentation of key research findings 
 
Attention should be paid to the correlation 
between the concepts of crime infrastructure and 
the tools of crime and other means as an element 
of the objective side of the crime. Thus, the 
instruments of committing a crime are generally 
the objects that are used by a person to physically 
influence material objects (firearms and 
weapons, tools, vehicles, devices, technical 
equipment, etc.), and other means are those 
objects, things, by which the crime was 
committed, which were used to facilitate the 
commission of the crime, but did not cause direct 
physical influence (forged documents, uniforms, 
tools, etc.) (Baulin, Borisov, & Tutyugin, 2010; 
Benitskyi, 2011; Kudryavtsev, 2007). Instead, 
the concept of crime infrastructure is much 
broader, and its elements include not only 
tangible objects, but also the intangible 
component - ideological resources, social 
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institutions and processes, as noted above. Also, 
unlike tools of crime and other means, some 
elements of the crime infrastructure can not be 
directly used in the commission of crime and 
their use is not directly causally related to the 
consequences of crime, however, their existence 
contributes to the functionality of crime as a 
system (despite for non-criminal functional 
purpose of such objects). 
 
Using as a methodological basis the approach to 
crime infrastructure, developed by O.F. 
Dolzhenkov, we characterize specific 
infrastructural components of bribery in the field 
of public service activities. Tracking the 
elements of bribery infrastructure as the main 
material and ideological environment for 
reproducing corruption behavior, analyzing and 
comprehending it will not only increase the 
effectiveness of counteracting this phenomenon 
but will also identify new priorities for strategy 
and tactics to combat crime in general. 
 
Therefore, the public service bribery 
infrastructure should be understood as a 
collection of "personnel", material and intangible 
resources, organizational forms and means that 
serve the illicit purchase/sale of services of 
public officials provide functionality and 
facilitate the institution of bribery. 
 
Such an understanding of the concept of bribery 
infrastructure in public service as a component of 
the content of relevant social relations, as well as 
the analysis of criminal proceedings (cases), 
questionnaire and content analysis of official 
reports in the media about bribery facts, allows 
distinguishing and organizing such specific 
infrastructure components. 
 
1. “Human resources” (corruption 
network) – a decentralized and often 
unformalized but consolidated 
community of bribery participants that 
exists on the basis and in the satisfaction 
of common corruption interests. 
 
Single corruption in today's Ukraine is becoming 
less common. He is being replaced by informal 
structures – corruption networks, which include 
groups of civil servants who provide appropriate 
solutions; commercial and financial structures 
that realize the benefits, benefits, income; law 
enforcement cover-up; persons who provide 
undue benefits and are interested in the activities 
of employees; mediators, as permanent 
participants in corruption schemes; other 
individual and collective entities. Moreover, 
high-ranking officials and politicians are usually 
the leaders of corruption networks. 
 
The activity of corruption networks is mainly 
manifested in the formation of interdependencies 
and interconnections between officials vertically 
and horizontally, at different levels, between 
different agencies and structures. These 
interconnections and interdependencies aim at 
the systematic execution of corruption 
agreements for personal enrichment, the 
allocation of budgetary funds in favor of 
corporations involved in the corruption network, 
the enhancement of profits or the competitive 
advantages of financial and credit and 
commercial entities involved in the corruption 
network. In addition, corruption networks can be 
structured by family, friendship, ethnicity, clan, 
religion, corporate identity, have multiple goals, 
and include various activities. They are formed 
on the principles of mutual assistance and 
solidarity; as wellas developed their own systems 
of rules, the observance of which is a priority for 
the state, family norms or the interests of their 
individual participants (Sungurov, 2000). 
Corruption networks have recently been regarded 
as the main and most powerful instrument of 
corruption agreements. However, law 
enforcement structures are mostly found to be 
"grassroots corruption" that exists outside of 
corruption networks and operate at the expense 
of "extortions" from the population (Karpenko, 
& Pashkovsky, 2013). 
 
The process of the corporatization of corruption 
and bribery is observed. As a result, the primitive 
initial form of relationship that mediates the short 
(one-off) relationship of the corruptor and the 
corrupt grows into long-term cooperation and 
informal contractual relationships. 
 
Official law enforcement websites are 
increasingly reporting systemic and long-term 
relationships that mediate the provision/receipt 
of undue gain. For example, employees of the 
Department for Combating Organized Crime of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in 
Rivne region exposed a group of persons who 
systematically demanded and received unlawful 
benefits from citizens for obtaining certificates of 
passing training, passing state examinations, and 
issuing driver's licenses. The group included 
several officials of various levels (Employees of 
the Department for Combating Organized Crime 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine of 
the Rivne region exposed the group that traded 
the driver's licenses, 2014). 
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Corruption corporatization processes make 
corruption networks not only more resilient and 
less vulnerable but also give rise to the 
phenomenon of the distribution of blame and 
responsibility in psychology. In particular, as 
noted by S.P. Glinkina, "the subjective 
perception of risk is reduced, if the official shares 
a bribe with the management, the seller gives part 
of the money to the head of the firm. Moreover, 
the larger the network of participants in the 
corruption agreement, the less the feeling of guilt 
and the risk of damaging the reputation in case of 
exposure” (Glinkina, 2019). This reduces the 
responsibility to oneself; the sense of guilt 
disappears, as there is a possibility of transferring 
the guilt to another. 
 
This component of the public service bribery 
infrastructure is characterized by:  
 
− The existence of relationships between 
corrupt behaviors at the level of 
horizontal and / or vertical power, at the 
level of family relations, friendships, 
other types of social relations (power-
subordination in the formation of 
corruption risks in the form of conflict 
of interests);  
− The presence of common or separate 
corruption interests of the participants 
of bribery, the realization of which is 
conditioned by committing actions with 
the use of power, official position;  
− As a rule, the participants of the bribery, 
experience of corruption behavior, 
awareness of the conditions and 
consequences of such activity;  
− Participation of “mediators” as 
permanent participants in corruption 
schemes that are “involved” in the 
sphere of state activity but are not 
employees (drivers, assistants, 
consultants, advisers, contractors and 
others);  
− One-time or periodic participants, 
preferably initiators or "forced" bribes. 
 
2. Organizational and auxiliary resources 
– a set of organizational forms and 
means aimed at optimizing the process 
of redistribution of money, property or 
other resources from beneficiaries to 
beneficiaries in exchange for providing 
the latter with legal or illegal services. 
 
These include intermediary enterprises that allow 
for the benefit of a pseudo-economic or other 
activity (carrying out "non-commodity 
transactions", fictitious (documented only) 
services or works, etc.). Law enforcement 
practice reveals the facts of the direct transfer of 
unlawful benefits from hand to hand or through 
simple methods of masking.  However, where the 
indirect, veiled transfer of undue gain through 
intermediaries is more commonly used. Such 
"intermediaries" are, among others, specially 
created enterprises for the achievement of 
criminal purposes. After paying for the services 
of such a structure by an interested person, the 
employee receives the due remuneration to him 
in one form or another already directly from "his" 
firm. This is demonstrated by investigative and 
judicial practice. Thus, the Security Service of 
Ukraine uncovered and terminated the criminal 
activity of the deputy chief of the State Tax 
Inspectorate of one of the cities of the Odesa 
region, which established a scheme of systematic 
solicitation and receipt of unlawful profit from 
the subjects of business activity for issuing 
permits - registration of taxpayers. At the request 
of the deputy chief, businessmen had to transfer 
money allegedly for the purchase of stationery to 
the account of a commercial entity owned by his 
accomplice. After receiving the predefined 
funds, the entrepreneur transferred them to cash 
and passed them to the tax specialist (In Odesa, 
Security Service of Ukraine detained a taxman 
and his accomplice on a bribe, 2018). 
 
This element of infrastructure may include 
organizations specially created by the members 
of the corruption scheme, cooperation with 
which is a condition for making the relevant 
decisions by the subject of public service activity 
or providing them. These organizations help to 
avoid direct contact between the official on 
whom a decision is made and those who give 
illegal benefits and are interested in the former. 
In this case, an undue benefit, such as in the form 
of cash, is masked under the guise of legal 
payment for the services of such an organization, 
with the subsequent transfer to the official. 
 
− Enterprises through which money 
laundering proceeds take place. It is the 
process of the legalization of funds that 
increases the profitability of the 
systematic receipt of illegal benefits 
since it enables the use of civil money 
freely in the future; 
− Charitable foundations and 
organizations, the specificity of which 
allows them to receive illegal benefits 
hidden under the guise of charitable 
contributions and to legalize the funds 
already received. The specified element 
of the bribery infrastructure is 
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somewhat similar to the previous ones, 
but has a separate meaning; 
− Peculiar funds for financing the current 
expenditures of the Office, which also 
go to the reproduction and expansion of 
corrupt transactions (untreated income, 
which are used to provide undue 
benefits). It is about the existence of the 
so-called "communities", the main 
source of formation of which are the 
funds obtained as a result of corruption 
activities. These "public associations" 
serve as a kind of fund for financing the 
current expenditures of the agency, 
which are not covered by state or local 
budgets (office supplies, etc.), and are 
also a source of providing undue 
benefits in the relations of officials in 
the vertical of management;  
− False accounts opened with third parties 
for crediting funds and accounts for 
legalized funds (current, deposit or card 
in domestic or foreign banking 
institutions). Today it is possible to 
speak about the trend of increasing use 
in corruption of participants of bribery 
of electronic payment systems, as well 
as bank cards, which does not require a 
personal meeting to give/receive undue 
benefits, as well as so-called "gift" 
certificates, fuel cards, etc. As for 
conducting electronic transactions used 
by participants of corruption bribery, 
they include transactions with bank 
(current, deposit, card and other) 
accounts, transactions with money 
transfer without opening a bank 
account, operations on managing an 
electronic bank account, Internet 
banking, etc. The use of such payment 
systems supports the coordination of 
criminal communications between 
counterparties to corruption, as well as 
criminal groups, by optimizing the 
reliability and dynamism of 
communications, which in turn 
contributes to the formation of their 
own information and economic space. 
Sometimes, banking institutions can be 
a major element of a corruption scheme. 
For example, during 2012-2013 in the 
Pechersk District Court of Kyiv, a 
criminal case over criminal activity of 
officials of the Deposit Guarantee Fund, 
which provides compensation at the 
expense of the Fund for losses caused in 
case of non-payment by a particular 
banking institution to an individual, was 
considered. Being participants in the 
corruption scheme, the bank's 
management opened deposit accounts 
for front-runners, without intending to 
return the invested funds in advance, 
and after the bank's deliberate 
bankruptcy, the front-end depositors 
received compensation at the expense of 
the Fund, and the invested funds were 
available to the management of the 
banking institution; 
− Computer and telecommunication 
networks, other technical means. The 
confidentiality of information on the 
conditions of bribery encourages 
negotiators to resort to certain technical 
and other means that would optimize 
the relationship between them. These 
are the means of protection against 
eavesdropping, the use of special means 
of communication in the negotiations 
between the contracting parties of 
bribery in the field of public service, 
vehicles, other means and accessories 
necessary for the organization and 
disguising of bribery; 
− Specifics of the organization of certain 
types of public service activities 
(specific construction of relations of 
power-subordination, the uncertainty of 
administrative procedures, which 
allows variability of decision-making, 
etc.). 
 
Taking into account the role of this component of 
the infrastructure in the mechanism of bribery in 
public service, it would be advisable when 
considering its criminological characteristics (in 
addition to specific criminal acts) to consider also 
the perilous organizational and auxiliary 
infrastructure components that do not have 
criminal features but contain. 
 
3. Ideological resources – criminal 
psychology, deformed legal and 
professional consciousness, criminal 
(corrupt) subculture (traditions, habits, 
informal rules, slang and symbolism), 
which shape the orientation of bribery 
and stereotypes of behavior (skills of 
conducting corruption negotiations; 
availability of knowledge of interested 
persons) on the established "fees" of 
services of officials). 
 
Psychological aspects of criminal behavior, 
needs, interests, as well as social values are 
crucial in its determination (Zelinskyi, 1999; 
Inshakov, 2002). 
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This, the conceptual basis for understanding 
bribery in public service is based on research in 
which offenses are explained in terms of the 
dialectical unity of individual psychological 
characteristics of personality and collective 
(group) psychology. This means the systematic 
determination of the activity of the subject, 
which involves the synthesis of external and 
internal determination (self-determination) of the 
crime. Recall that one of the aspects of self-
determination and self-reproduction of bribery is 
an anomaly in the behavior of citizens, a special 
psychological state of recognition of 
admissibility, the permissibility of corruption 
and bribery, their impunity, which compels other 
persons to commit such acts. 
 
These processes are legitimized by the Ukrainian 
legal culture. Such stereotypes of behavior, 
which have become common as a result of 
repeated repetition, are reproduced in society and 
are common to its members. 
 
In addition, the individual level of criminal 
behavior is characterized by some motives and 
can be explained primarily through the prism of 
the theory of alienation, according to which the 
offender is at a certain social and psychological 
distance from society and its values (Antonyan, 
Enikeev, & Eminov, 1996). 
 
The corrupt behavior of a public sector official in 
the form of bribery can be considered as 
inconsistency of personal moral principles with 
public norms of morality and law, which can 
occur both during the performance of official 
powers (professional deformation) and before 
taking office. In a transitional Ukrainian society, 
there are more and more cases where corrupt 
officials are admitted to the service in corrupt 
systems. 
 
Moreover, the phenomenon of bribery in the 
sphere of public service activity is characterized 
not only and not so much by the pathology of the 
individual behavior of its participants 
(counterparties), but by the dominant psychology 
of the collective, the dysfunction of social 
institutions, the system of administrative 
management and the legal system as a whole. In 
the plane of corruption relations, collective 
psychology manifests itself in the dominant 
(dominant) influence on the individual from the 
environment of criminogenic attitudes, habits, 
and abilities. Even at the subconscious level, the 
person is exposed to an inner sense of "acting as 
everyone". The sources of these processes are 
diverse. The main objective is social 
disorganization. The "failure" of the activities of 
social institutions leads to gaps in their 
effectiveness, which is "filled" with unauthorized 
illegal actions. The person understands that his 
actions are contrary to the law, but are guided by 
a certain "justice", certain "own ideas", practical 
examples of which he encounters in real life, the 
sources of which are in no way the result of law-
abiding thinking. 
 
Therefore, the corruption activity of some 
individuals involves in their orbit other people 
who find themselves dependent on this activity. 
People lead a corrupt way of life, create a 
criminal environment of existence, which they 
not only construct but also reproduce at the 
expense of other people. As a consequence, 
collective criminal psychology is formed – a kind 
of new collective thinking based on asocial 
values (Dremin, 2009). 
 
Moreover, it is quite reasonable for some 
scholars to think that research efforts should 
concentrate on the problem of the social genesis 
of corruption as a large-scale social phenomenon, 
rather than on the criminal practices of taken 
separately individuals (Alekseev, 2008). 
 
Psychological aspects of the phenomenon of the 
spread and reproduction of corruption bribe also 
include the attitude of society to this problem. 
Three important features of Ukrainian society’s 
attitude to this problem are directly related to our 
mass psychology. 
 
The first feature is the tolerance for corruption 
and bribery, as well as their attitude towards 
widespread phenomena ("everyone takes," 
"everyone steals"), a minimal level of evil that 
does not deserve serious condemnation. 
 
The second important feature of our perception 
of these processes is that the expressed 
condemnation on the part of the society is 
received only by the exorbitant amounts of undue 
benefit, especially when it is received out of 
order. For example, the case where the head of 
one of the district state administrations in 
Kherson demanded and received an unlawful 
profit of 6.9 million UAH from a private 
entrepreneur for issuing orders for the transfer to 
the 11 citizens of land plots with a total area of 
21 hectares for personal farming (Information 
about the anti-corruption measures taken by the 
Prosecutor's Office of Zhytomyr region and 
about persons prosecuted for committing 
corruption offenses in 2012…, 2013). If the 
amount of the illegal benefit were smaller, then 
the public official would be more likely to avoid 
liability. 
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A third feature is the inconsistency and 
contradiction of corruption. In condemning 
corruption and its individual forms, our public 
consciousness views its manifestations in 
everyday life as natural human relations, which 
find expression in the language: they say that the 
bribe-taker "helped the person" and the bribe-
giver – that he "thanked" for the help provided. 
 
Recently, the importance of subcultural attributes 
in the institutionalization of corruption in general 
and its most widespread and dangerous form of 
bribery in the sphere of public service activity 
has to be asserted. In the process of counterparty 
corruption, common rules, a common ideological 
basis, certain value orientations, which are 
considered unacceptable, have been drawn up. 
So Y.I. Gilinskyi notes that the processes of 
formation of corruption practices, regular and 
long-term, are evidenced by the existence of 
certain rules of the game, norms known to the 
subjects of corruption activity; certain slang and 
symbolism (for example, the well-known and 
understandable gesture of rubbing the thumb of 
the forefinger and middle finger) of corruption; 
service fee is established and known to the 
interested parties (Gilinskyi, 2003). 
 
In the domestic legal culture, such expressions as 
“seek an exit to…” (hereinafter referred to as the 
name of an official), “give honor”, “show 
respect”, “money in advance” and so on have 
long been legitimized. 
 
Subcultural attributes include certain rules for 
masking negotiations between contractors of 
bribery for relationships that lie in the plane of 
legitimacy; abbreviations known only to bribes 
and more. Thus, the amount of money in the 
process of agreement of participants in 
corruption relations can have a figurative 
expression in a certain number of copies of 
documents that need to be transferred, kilograms 
of potatoes, the use of other metaphors. For 
example, officials may not use the words 
"money", "rollback", "millions", and replace the 
word "bribe" with "dissertation". In telephone 
conversations, they discuss not the question of 
dissertation protection, but the question of who 
to whom and how much should give money for 
the provision of land for construction, as clearly 
demonstrated by psychological and linguistic 
expertise. Accordingly, it may be so: 
"dissertation" is money; "scientific council" is 
the officials who have allocated this land, 
"scientific supervisor" – the bribe-taker 
(Shulepova, 2013; Alexandrova, 2013). 
 
In this aspect, we fully share the assertion of 
Professor V.M. Dremin that a special culture has 
emerged in society, which can be called corrupt. 
The specified cultural environment is 
characterized by all features of the subculture, 
including specific worldview, value orientations, 
ideology, features of group psychology (Dremin, 
2003). 
 
Conclusions 
 
So, the public service bribery infrastructure 
should be understood as a collection of 
"personnel", material and intangible resources, 
organizational forms and means that serve the 
illicit purchase/sale of services of public officials 
provide functionality and facilitate the institution 
of bribery. 
 
Thus, such an understanding of the concept of 
bribery infrastructure in public service as a 
component of the content of relevant social 
relations, as well as the analysis of criminal 
proceedings (cases), questionnaire and content 
analysis of official reports in the media about 
bribery facts, allows distinguishing and 
organizing such specific infrastructure 
components. 
 
1. “Human resources” (corruption 
network) – a decentralized and often 
unformalized but consolidated 
community of bribery participants that 
exists on the basis and in the satisfaction 
of common corruption interests. 
2. Organizational and auxiliary resources 
– a set of organizational forms and 
means aimed at optimizing the process 
of redistribution of money, property or 
other resources from beneficiaries to 
beneficiaries in exchange for providing 
the latter with legal or illegal services. 
3. Ideological resources – criminal 
psychology, deformed legal and 
professional consciousness, criminal 
(corrupt) subculture (traditions, habits, 
informal rules, slang and symbolism), 
which shape the orientation of bribery 
and stereotypes of behavior (skills of 
conducting corruption negotiations; 
availability of knowledge of interested 
persons) on the established "fees" of 
services of officials). 
 
To expose the corruption environment, it is 
advisable to use the category of bribery 
infrastructure, which refers to the aggregate of 
tangible and intangible resources, organizational 
forms and means that serve the illegal 
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purchase/sale of services of public sector 
officials, provide functionality and facilitate the 
institution of bribery. The components of the 
infrastructure are "human resources" (corruption 
network); organizational and support resources; 
ideological resources. 
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